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3.  Linkages between regional trade agreements and
international production networks:
Evidence from five case studies in Asia
Mochamad Pasha
3.1. Background
International production networks have become important drivers of global trade as
well as regional trade in Asia, particularly in the past two decades.  These networks are
channels through which national economies are becoming interlinked by using the
advantages of production fragmentation.  The establishment of networks has influenced the
patterns of trade in Asian economies (see, for example, Athukorala, forthcoming).  Trade
agreements have been another major factor influencing trade patterns (and flows).  Since
1995, there has been a proliferation of free (or preferential
1) trade arrangements, both
bilateral and regional.
The pattern of global trade in terms of commodity and geographical structure has
indeed changed substantially in the past three decades.  This was marked by an increasing
share of trade in parts and components in total trade, compared with trade in final goods.
Statistically, for example, the value of trade in parts and components increased three times
from 1987 to 2003, while the value of trade in final goods increased by about two times
during the same period.  This increase represents an increase in the share of trade in parts
and components from 16 per cent in 1987 to 20 per cent in 2003.
Based on the literature survey detailed in the previous chapter, much of the increase
in the global parts and components trade was in the East Asian region.  Many recent studies
(e.g., Ando and Kimura, 2003; Kimura and Ando, 2005a; and Athukorala and Yamashita,
2006) have shown evidence of this change.  Ando and Kimura (2003), for example, noted
very high shares of parts and components in machinery trade for countries in the region,
reaching about 40 per cent to 50 per cent.  In the case of South-East Asian countries, the
share reached about 80 per cent.  Meanwhile, Athukorala and Yamashita (2006) showed
that the share of East Asian countries – excluding Japan – in global exports almost doubled
between the early 1990s and 2000s.  They also noted that the degree of dependence on the
trade in components was proportionally greater in the East Asian region than in other
regions of the world.
The increased trade in parts and components indicates the rising importance of
IPNs.  The formation of the network is facilitated by the growing production fragmentation, at
the international level.  According to Athukorala and Yamashita (2006), international
1 The term “preferential trade agreement” is also used in the literature to denote an exception from the
non-discriminatory principle of WTO (MFN clause – Article I).  In the current study, RTA refers to any
type of reciprocal exchange of discriminatory trade concessions between two or more countries.40
production fragmentation is broadly defined as cross-border dispersion of component/
assembly within a vertically integrated production process, with each country specializing in
a particular stage of the production sequence.
Ando and Kimura (2003) and Kimura and Ando (2005a) provided some evidence at
the company level on the existence of international production fragmentation – and hence,
IPNs – using data from Japanese firms operating in East Asian countries.
2  Among other
findings, these two studies showed that investment by Japanese companies was directed
more to other countries in East Asia and that it was concentrated more in the manufacturing
sector, which differed from the Japanese investment in North America and European
countries.  In addition to the investment factor, another Japanese corporate behaviour
characteristic perhaps provides more support for the claimed importance of international
production fragmentation and IPNs – i.e., Japanese affiliates in the East Asian region are
more export-oriented than those in other parts of the world.  More importantly, from the
perspective of “regional” production networks (i.e., international production networks
operating in a single geographical region), most Japanese affiliates in East Asia direct their
exports back to the region.
The extent of participation by individual countries in production networks greatly
varies.  In South-East Asia there are three layers of countries with regard to participation in
IPNs.  The countries that are most involved are Malaysia and Thailand.  The middle layer
comprises Indonesia and the Philippines while the bottom layer includes countries that have
yet to become more integrated in the global /regional production networks and trade.
Parallel to the growing trend of IPNs, in recent years there has also been
a proliferation of preferential trade agreements, particularly in East Asia.  The rapid increase
in the number of RTAs signed by countries in East Asia was triggered by competition
between China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.  The ASEAN-China Free Trade
Agreement is the third-largest free trade area in the world, in terms of geographical scope,
after the European Union and NAFTA.  The significant size of the Chinese economy and the
establishment of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement triggered the domino effect that
resulted in the proliferation of trade agreements in the region.
As noted in the introduction, this chapter addresses the question as to the extent
that regional trade arrangements affect the existing IPNs.  Do they moderate, inhibit or
foster development or have no effect (i.e., are neutral) on existing IPNs.  The study
described here is expected to contribute to the existing literature in at least two ways.  First,
it adds to the empirical facts on IPNs.  As noted by Kimura (2006a), there is a need to
expand the empirical literature (particularly from the East Asian region), as such findings are
necessary for the enhancement of theoretical thinking on the subject.  Unlike the other
topics related to trade and industrialization, the phenomenon of IPNs is still relatively new
and thus there is plenty of room for theoretical development.  The second potential
contribution is a better understanding on the “mechanism” behind the international
2 See also Kuchiki, 2005, for an example of regional production network formation in China’s
automotive sector, i.e., Toyota’s plants in Tianjin.41
production networks, particularly in relation to the world’s growing reliance on regional
integration
This chapter presents the results of five country case studies that explore linkages
between IPNs and RTAs in three different sectors.  The case studies focus on sectors in
which IPNs are prevalent in the selected countries.  The studies on China, India and
Indonesia focus on the automotive industry.  The study on Thailand covers the hard-disk
drive industry while the Bangladesh study concentrates on the textile and clothing sector.
This chapter begins with a brief description of the establishment of IPNs in East Asia in
order to introduce the following sections on the automotive, hard disk drive, and textile and
clothing sectors.
3.2. Establishment of IPNs in Asia
The rise of IPNs in East Asia can be explained by two policy factors.  Going back to
the 1980s, the “hollowing-out” of the Japanese economy triggered the relocation of
Japanese firms to neighbouring countries (Baldwin, 2007).  The hollowing-out was caused
by the erosion of the competitiveness of Japanese industries, stemming from the increase in
unit labour costs.  Meanwhile, about the same time, developing countries in East Asia, such
as the four “tigers”, began implementing the so-called “dual-track” strategic approach to
industrialization (Kimura, 2006a).  The idea of the dual-track approach is to promote import
substitution and exports simultaneously.
The hollowing-out of Japan and the dual track approach of developing East Asian
countries complemented one another.  This combination of policies set off another sequence
of policy responses from the countries that had been the destination for the industrial
relocations of Japanese companies (Baldwin, 2006).  The scope of the policies was on trade
and investment in order to attract investment by more firms.  The investment policy
response focused on attracting foreign direct investment (FDI).  The trade policy response
was, in essence, a unilateral reduction in tariffs, often regarded as a “race to the bottom”
(Baldwin, 2006).  Most of the tariff cuts were in the form of duty drawback and duty-free
treatment specifically for relocation in export processing zones (EPZs).  Over time, trade
policy shifted away from these special treatments, such as those mentioned above, to
lowering applied MFN tariff rates in expectation of lower trade costs.  Hence, many of these
countries continued to cut their tariffs unilaterally from 1989 to 2003 (Baldwin, 2006).
Therefore, the cumulative effect from the hollowing-out of developed countries in East Asia,
dual-track industrialization, and trade and investment liberalization prompted development
of production networks within East Asia.
The previous discussion reveals that the establishment and growth of IPNs in East
Asia has been driven by market forces rather than by formal trade and investment
agreements.  This is because the bulk of the unilateral tariff cuts that occurred in the 1980s
and 1990s were motivated by pressure from the private sector on their governments
(Baldwin, 2007) as well as the so-called Washington consensus.  In the aftermath of the
1997-1998 Asian economic crisis, initiatives were introduced for advancing regional
integration in East Asia; in other words, attempts were made to formalize the establishment42
of IPNs through trade agreements.  One example is the expectation of policymakers in
Indonesia that the establishment of the Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership agreement
would expand and strengthen the production network developed by MNCs and other firms,
particularly in the automotive sector where tariffs for numerous auto parts and components
were reduced, thereby increasing the country’s exports and promoting economic growth.
That expectation has yet to be realized, as indicated during the interviews with Indonesian
automakers who mentioned they had not yet experienced the effect of the agreement.
Nevertheless, there is still a need to explore the impacts of these conscious efforts to
expand regional trade and widen regional integration of already established IPNs and on the
establishment of new ones.
One caveat has to be mentioned.  Despite the increasing number of trade
agreements in the region,
3 only a handful have been fully implemented so far (see annex to
this chapter).  Therefore, it is perhaps too early to explore the impacts of RTAs.
Another factor in the development of IPNs is the reduction of service links, which
make connecting with the network more efficient and cheaper, and translates into a deeper
level of integration in IPNs.  In relation to the current study, one way of examining the
service link costs is through the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) ranking calculated by the
World Bank.  It is clear from looking at the rankings that China has taken major steps to
improve its trade infrastructure in order to gain a stronger foothold in IPNs that have led to
the impressive economic growth of that country.  The LPI ranking for Indonesia is rather
peculiar as it exhibits a sharp decrease in the span of just three years.  It should be noted
that LPI rankings are based on the perceptions of actors in the global freight forwarding and
express carriers industry.  As such, Indonesia’s LPI ranking is interpreted as indicating that
the country is lagging behind in improving its logistics infrastructure compared to other
countries, such as China.
4  Although the LPI index may not be a particularly good indicator,
as it relies on perceptions, it does provide an approximate indication of the logistics situation
in the countries it ranks.
 3 China initiating an RTA with ASEAN (ASEAN-China FTA) triggered the proliferation of RTAs in the
region.  The ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) encouraged Japan and Republic of Korea to pursue similar
agreements, either collectively with ASEAN or bilaterally, in order to remain competitive in the region.
4 World Bank Logistics Performance Index 2010: Indonesia.
Table 3.1. LPI ranking of selected countries






Source: World Bank, 2010.43
From the case studies it was found that:
(a) All five countries surveyed had adopted similar liberalization policies in
developing their industries, albeit to varying degrees;
(b) The case studies also support the finding that IPNs predate RTA with MNCs
and their partners operating in the automotive, electronics, and textile and
clothing sectors.  In general, Indonesia and Thailand were the first countries to
participate in the formation of IPNs in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Trade
and investment promotion polices have been used largely by these two
countries, especially Thailand, to attract the establishment of local production
facilities by foreign MNCs.  Moreover, both countries are part of the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA), which dates back to 1992;
(c) India and Bangladesh also began to liberalize their economies in the 1980s by
allowing more liberal access to foreign firms and developing their private
sectors.  Both countries also actively took part in trade agreements as far back
as 1975 with the signing of Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA, then known
as the Bangkok Agreement);
(d) China only began taking an active role in establishing RTAs after its accession
to WTO in 2001.  It also joined APTA in 2002 and started to play an important
role in the proliferation of RTAs in the region, as discussed earlier.
As already established these five countries are engaged in IPNs in various forms
and are a part of various RTAs.  The extent of the network integration between the countries
varies, depending on the policy environment in each country and the industries concerned.
The following synthesis of the research findings starts by providing summaries of
the individual country studies.  It then identifies common issues across industries and
countries covered by the study.  The analysis is aimed at obtaining a better perspective on
industry characteristics and common issues, which is essential to formulating policy
recommendations.
3.3. Presentation of key findings from the selected sectors
3.3.1. Automotive industry
Japanese MNCs dominate the Indian and Indonesian automotive industries.  In
Indonesia, 90 per cent of the market is dominated by Japanese products.  In China,
however, the market shares are relatively more balanced between Japanese, the United
States and European companies.  The leading foreign companies in the automotive
industries of China, India and Indonesia include Toyota, Suzuki, Volkswagen and Chrysler.
The initial development of the industry in the five countries differed.  The automotive
industry in China began with the establishment of First Auto Works in 1953, followed by the
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation and Dongfeng Motors in 1958 and 1967,
respectively.  Foreign MNCs only entered the Chinese auto industry in the 1980s when44
Chrysler and Volkswagen were permitted to form joint ventures with the three local
corporations.
In India, despite the establishment of the automotive industry in the 1940s, growth in
the industry only began to pick up in the 1970s, because cars were previously considered
a luxury, expansion was limited and tariffs were prohibitive.  In 1985, India gained its first
auto joint venture business when the local company Maruti Udyog entered the passenger
vehicle market with Suzuki.  Coupled with economic reforms in India, joint ventures began to
flourish – culminating in the 1990s when the Indian automotive industry was dominated by
Maruti Suzuki, Tata Motors and Hindustan Motors plus Premier Padmini in the motorcycle
market.
The Indonesian automotive industry began as early as the 1920s with General
Motors setting up a production facility to supply the colonial market.  However, the industry
only began to take off in the 1970s as an import substitution industry.  Initially, Indonesia
was an importer of automobiles and parts.  However, the Government of Indonesia at that
time imposed a ban on the import of completely built up (CBU) cars and prohibited foreign
MNCs from assembling and distributing directly.  Thus, joint ventures were established to
serve the domestic market; MNCs from Japan, the United States and Europe had to
establish joint ventures with domestic partners to import cars in completely knocked down
(CKD) form for assembly and distribution.  Japanese joint venture companies included PT.
Indomobil Suzuki International and PT.  Toyota Astra Motor.
There are similarities in the development of the automotive industries in each of the
three countries.  Policies directed at liberalizing the industries initiated the participation of
MNCs, thereby planting the seed for IPNs.  Even though MNCs were already established in
the early 1980s, their activities only began to expand in the late 1980s.  Figure 3.1 shows
that the average applied MFN tariff rates for selected East Asian countries have been
reduced significantly since 1988.  As tariffs are an important component of service link
costs, the reductions have also meant that such costs can be appropriately reduced.  As
stated by Baldwin (2006), the unilateral “race to the bottom” (i.e., unilateral tariff
liberalization) prompted the development of IPNs.  However, as will be explained later in this
chapter, these low applied MFN rates may have had a limited liberalization effect of RTAs.
Incentives in the form of liberalization policies ensure that costs of relocation for
MNCs are less than the benefits.  Therefore, all three countries surveyed have relied on
incentives to encourage foreign MNCs to establish production locally.  The Government of
India has a range of incentives aimed at developing the automotive industry, ranging from
the provision of excise duty and tax incentives as well as incentives to promote R&D, to
export promotion measures and reductions of import duty on components.  Indonesia has
incentives in the form of zero tariffs for imports of components for passenger vehicles with
local content exceeding 40 per cent and for commercial vehicles with local content
exceeding 60 per cent.  Incentives in China include reductions in tax rates when making
fixed asset investments, priority approval when listing on stock exchanges, and easier
access to capital from abroad and government loans.45
In the development of the automotive industry in China and India, despite the high
profile of MNCs, local companies have taken an active role and have maintained a strong
presence in the market.  Local automakers began to emerge in China with companies such
as Geely, Cherry and Brilliance.  Tata Motors in India recently launched its low-cost product,
the Nano.  Thus the automotive industries in China and India are able to manufacture their
own products and compete with foreign MNCs.
Conversely, Indonesia’s attachment to automotive giants from Japan stems from the
fact that developing a competitive automotive industry needs huge investment, research and
development, which are currently scarce in that country.  Thus, local firms prefer to partner
with more experienced MNCs, such as Toyota, Suzuki and Daihatsu, in developing new
products.  One example is the production of the Toyota Avanza and Daihatsu
5 Xenia,
combining Daihatsu’s skill in developing compact cars and Toyota’s high-quality standards.
The product has a local content of between 60 per cent and 70 per cent.
Thus, participation in the production network has enabled China and India to
develop local products, while the network has enabled Indonesian automakers to tap into
the vast resources of MNCs to develop its own product.
Figure 3.1. Simple average applied MFN rates in East Asian countries
Source: UNCTAD TRAINS.
Notes: Thailand data for 2002 and 2004 are not available.  For the Republic of Korea, data for 1993,
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5 In Indonesia, Daihatsu is Toyota’s subsidiary.46
The role of the components and parts industry is vital because it provides support to
car manufacturers.  In addition, component manufacturing can expand a country’s
involvement in IPNs, taking advantage of the increasingly fragmented manufacturing
process.  In the past, auto makers in China imported parts and components.  Today,
a growing number of the components are manufactured in China for both domestic use and
export.  This is mainly due to the influx of major components manufacturers in China.  This
scenario is perhaps due to tariff reductions for parts and components tariffs as well as final
products.  In 2006, the tariffs for cars, SUVs and minibuses in China were reduced from
28 per cent to 25 per cent.  Components such as transmissions, clutches and radiators are
subject to a 10 per cent tariff rate.  Moreover, taxes on selected parts have also been
reduced from 13.8 per cent to 10 per cent.
Of the world’s top 100 auto parts and components firms, 70 per cent have already
set up production facilities in China, including, for example, Delphi, Bosch, Visteon and
Continental.  Local auto parts and components manufacturers such as Wanxiang, Shaanxi
Fast, Fuyao Glass, Xinyi Glass and Nanjing Autocar have also made notable entries in the
components sector by taking advantage of the 1,000 auto parts industrial parks across the
country.  This indicates that agglomeration supports the strengthening of IPNs by reducing
service link costs and coordination issues between production blocks, implying the spatial
advantage that China enjoys.  Improvements made by local components manufacturers in
terms of design and quality have contributed to the growing significance of China in the auto
parts and components export market.  Even though China is a late entrant in the auto parts
and components industry, economies of scale of its industry have reduced the average
service link costs, thereby providing these firms with a competitive edge over other
manufacturers.
In summary, the success of China’s automotive industry is attributable to four
factors:
(a) Low labour costs, at least at the initial stage;
(b) Incentives provided by the Government including, among others, land, import
and export duty rebates, and conditional access to the domestic market;
(c) The size of the Chinese economy, which allows the exploitation of economies
of scale and can be used to gain a competitive edge in other markets; and
(d) Protection of the domestic automotive sector, which provides the opportunity
for domestic firms to increase capacity and capability.
Thus, the case of China provides evidence that trade barriers may act as an
effective tool for developing competitive advantage.  However, three conditions must exist in
order to allow that to happen:  (a) a significant domestic market; (b) an initial competitive
advantage in the industry, such as low labour costs; and (c) a specific (that is, with a finite
duration) period of protection.
The development of auto parts and components in India began in the 1960s.  Local
content policy, entitled the Phased Manufacturing Programme, was introduced in 1991 and
laid the foundations for further development of the Indian auto components industry, which47
is relatively labour-intensive and is currently undergoing transition to become more
competitive in world markets, relying on its advantage of skill-oriented, labour-intensive
components production.  Manufacturing costs in India are 25 per cent to 30 per cent lower
than those of its western counterparts and there is a well-established pool of engineering
talent, which has resulted in MNCs such as Suzuki relocating their R&D centres to India.
Thus, India’s auto parts and components industry is in a good position to support the growth
of its automotive industry.  Industrial clusters also play an important role in the Indian
industry, with most components suppliers located close to original equipment
manufacturers.  The three main automotive industrial clusters in India are located in
Chennai, Pune and the National Capital Region, which includes New Delhi and its
surrounding areas.  The development of auto parts and components in India began in the
1960s.
In Indonesia, however, the auto parts and components industry is still
underdeveloped compared to the vehicle assembling industry.  Attempts were made to
encourage the growth of the auto parts and components industry in Indonesia through
a local content policy throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, as in the case of India.  The
Government of Indonesia introduced incentive schemes, such as tariff exemptions for local
content between 40 per cent and 60 per cent, to increase local content in cars manufactured
domestically.  However, the launch of the “National Car Programme” in 1996, which was not
in line with WTO principles,
6 derailed the incentives programme.  A new policy aimed at the
automotive industry, and which was in line with WTO recommendations, was implemented
in 1999.  This policy adopted the approach of reducing tariffs for auto parts and components
to zero, thereby encouraging the imports of components to boost the industry’s output.  The
“local content policy” was completely abandoned in favour of opening the market.  However,
car manufacturers pay only a 5 per cent duty when exporting their products to any ASEAN
member country, provided the products have a minimum of 40 per cent local content from
any ASEAN member (applying the cumulation principle).
With regard to the “race to the bottom” in tariff protection, figure 3.2 compares the
reductions in tariff rates imposed in 1999 and 2009 by the three countries on auto parts and
components.  The largest reduction was in India where the average tariff for auto parts and
components was 30.6 per cent in 1999 and 8.9 per cent in 2009.  The tariff reductions were
vital to the promotion of IPNs in the three countries, since it would be cheaper to move
components between production blocks.
Identifying the countries’ major trading partners in auto parts and components
around the world is useful in revealing whether their major partners comprised mainly East
Asian countries (table 3.2).  China’s top five export destinations for auto parts and
components are the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Germany and the United
Arab Emirates.  Meanwhile, China relies heavily on imports from Japan, Germany, the
Republic of Korea, Hungary and the United States.  The diverse regional representation in
China’s major trading partners in exports and imports indicates that while China is deeply
6 The “National Car Programme” violated Indonesia’s obligation under GATT Article I on General MFN
Treatment as well as Article III on National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation.48
Figure 3.2. Simple average applied MFN tariffs for auto parts and components
Source: UNCTAD TRAINS raw data.
Note: Tariff data for India do not specifically mention applied tariffs.
integrated in East Asia, it also connects with other markets.  Japan and the Republic of

























Table 3.2. China’s top five trading partners
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Export partner (as percentage of total exports of parts and components)
United States 34.17 34.16 34.60 30.96 26.59
Japan 10.81 10.83 10.60 9.25 8.91
Republic of Korea 1.63 2.01 3.08 3.79 3.93
Germany 2.30 2.53 2.83 2.86 3.07
United Arab Emirates 2.90 2.65 2.46 2.50 3.01
Import partner (as percentage of total imports of parts and components)
Japan 34.77 39.51 38.15 38.65 43.57
Germany 25.83 16.59 20.42 23.83 25.58
Republic of Korea 14.83 23.03 15.98 11.59 8.94
Hungary 2.18 1.02 2.23 3.99 4.43
United States 3.43 4.25 4.93 5.45 4.04
Source: Calculations based on United Nations Comtrade data.49
Table 3.3. India’s top five trading partners
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Export partner (as percentage of total exports of parts and components)
United States 18.94 17.11 19.50 18.19 17.61
Italy 3.61 4.87 6.04 6.88 6.69
United Arab Emirates 5.69 6.19 5.08 4.71 4.40
Germany 3.86 2.88 3.00 4.09 4.30
United Kingdom 5.54 4.93 4.38 5.76 3.68
Import partner (as percentage of total imports of parts and components)
Republic of Korea 32.83 27.31 25.69 29.42 28.06
Japan 19.93 16.43 10.54 12.41 16.56
China 2.29 5.64 9.86 12.23 12.68
Thailand 6.93 12.98 10.56 8.83 7.23
Czech Republic 9.71 10.97 14.26 6.57 6.09
Source: Calculations based on United Nations Comtrade data.
Meanwhile, India’s major export destinations comprised non-East Asian countries,
which may explain India’s modest East Asian export values (table 3.3).  The United States
and European countries are India’s main export partners.  However, on the import side,
India’s import sources comprise mainly East Asian countries, i.e., the Republic of Korea,
Japan, China and Thailand.  This suggests that India is becoming increasingly dependent
on East Asian countries for parts and components.  It also explains India’s automotive
industry’s reserved attitude towards pursuing RTAs with East Asia, as it fears such
agreements would only result in one-way trade.
Indonesia’s major trading partners are all East Asian countries (table 3.4).  However,
Indonesia imports more than it exports, reflecting the fact that the country’s auto parts and
components sector is not yet well developed.  Japan is the dominant partner, which
supports the argument that the Indonesian auto industry is heavily connected with Japanese
MNCs.  The dominance of Japan and Thailand, both as export destinations and import
sources, underlines the fact that Indonesia is a part of the production network built by
Japanese MNCs, with Thailand as its hub, to increase their foothold in the region.  A good
example is Honda, which made Thailand its production base (Raymundo and Taningco,
2009).  Honda not only conducts assembling in South-East Asia, but also builds
components – i.e., constant velocity joints produced in Malaysia, intake valves in the
Philippines, engine parts in Indonesia, and body and stamped parts in Thailand.  In addition
to the production side, IPNs provide steadily increasing car sales opportunities in emerging
markets (Tullao, Conchada and Aguinaldo, 2009) such as China, India and Indonesia, given
the size of their populations.50
Table 3.4. Top five trading partners of Indonesia
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Export partner (as percentage of total exports of parts and components)
Japan 23.88 24.36 24.07 23.66 21.28
Thailand 9.25 8.63 9.97 10.55 12.07
United States 7.79 7.22 12.71 13.47 11.97
Malaysia 8.80 13.88 9.14 6.29 8.51
Philippines 5.79 4.45 3.79 3.89 4.72
Import partner (as percentage of total imports of parts and components)
Japan 62.03 56.97 47.20 33.51 45.59
Thailand 14.63 17.92 22.95 32.82 28.40
China 4.62 4.18 5.23 8.16 5.96
Malaysia 2.07 2.68 3.37 4.25 4.79
Singapore 1.41 1.78 3.34 2.18 3.18
Source: Calculations based on United Nations Comtrade data.
Table 3.5 shows the intra-industry trade (IIT) index
7, which signals the existence of
IPNs, for auto parts and components of the three countries with East Asia from 2004 to
2008, using the formula developed by Grubel and Lloyd (1975) in which the values of IIT lie
between 0 and 1:
IIT =
where X stands for exports, M for imports, i for a product or a sector, and n for total number
of products or sectors.
When the index is close to 1, this indicates the existence of IPNs.  The IIT of both
China and Indonesia with East Asia showed an increasing trend during the period studied.
Nevertheless, the IIT for Indonesia fell from 0.98 in 2007 to 0.81 in 2008, when the IIT was
less close to 1; this may be due to the slowdown in the Indonesian automotive industry
brought about by the economic downturn.  However, the IIT during the same period
indicated the existence of IPNs between East Asia, China and Indonesia, and that the extent
of this network was increasing.  The IIT for India from 2004 to 2008 appears relatively
modest compared with those of China and Indonesia, suggesting that the network between
India and East Asia was not as extensive as those between its two counterparts.
7 Calculated based on SITC Revision 3 at the 4- and 5-digit levels.  Tyres for motor cars, tyres for
motorcycles, and motor vehicle chasses and engines are at the 4-digit level, respectively.  The remaining
data that is used is at the 5-digit level.  For a complete list of product codes used for the automotive
sector, see Annex II.
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As reported by Ramasamy (chapter 4 in this volume), China’s IIT for parts and
components almost tripled from 23 per cent in 1992 to 60 per cent in 2007; the increase in
IIT occurred for most product categories in the parts and components sector.  Meanwhile,
Nag (Chapter 5 in this volume) reported that the IIT of India with Western countries was high
compared to the ITT with East Asian countries, particularly for ignition parts and seats
(United States) where the ITT was 0.55 and 0.57, respectively, rubber products (Italy), and
chassis and body parts (Germany).  Therefore, this raises the question of whether the
Indian automotive sector can benefit from RTAs between India and East Asian countries.
Among the three countries surveyed, China was the more dominant in East Asia, in
terms of both exports and imports of auto parts and components (figure 3.3).  During
2004-2008, its import values increased from $1.62 billion in 2004 to $5.46 billion in 2008.
Meanwhile, Indian and Indonesian exports to East Asia were much lower than those of
Table 3.5. IIT in auto parts and components with East Asia
Country
Intra-industry trade index
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
China 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.94 0.95
India 0.76 0.83 0.81 0.72 0.68
Indonesia 0.89 0.93 0.99 0.98 0.81
Source: Calculations based on United Nations Comtrade data, using SITC
Revision 3 at the 4- and 5-digit levels.  For a complete list of product codes
used for the automotive sector, see Annex II.
Figure 3.3. Exports of auto parts and components to East Asia











































China and were relatively stable, with Indonesia ranging between $900 million and
$1 billion and India remaining below $1 billion during the same period.
China’s imports from East Asia also increased significantly from $4.33 billion in 2004
to $7.09 billion in 2008 (figure 3.4).  Meanwhile, contrary to their export trends, India and
Indonesia’s imports of auto parts and components increased.  India’s imports from East Asia
increased from $500 million in 2004 to $2.09 billion in 2008.  Indonesia’s imports of auto
parts and components also showed an increasing trend, albeit with a minor decrease
between 2005 and 2007, after which they increased sharply in 2008 to $3.34 billion.
Figure 3.4. Imports of auto parts and components from East Asia













































The observed trend uncovered the increasing significance of the East Asian market
in the case of China, with both exports and imports growing.  Meanwhile, figures for Indian
and Indonesian exports to East Asia were low and relatively stagnant.  However, their
imports from East Asia showed an increasing trend, indicating that India and Indonesia rely
more on imports of parts and components from East Asia, with Indonesia being the more
dependent of the two countries.  The export and import figures also indicate that the
integration is deeper in the case of China compared to India and Indonesia.
Table 3.6 details exports of auto parts and components by China, India and
Indonesia to East Asia.  Note the similarities between the exported products, which suggest
that trade is done based on the quality of similar products that are produced in these three
countries.  On the import side (table 3.7), India and Indonesia import similar products, which
confirms that trade in these products between East Asia and the two countries is based on
the difference in product quality.  Meanwhile, with the exception of SITC 78439 and 78432,
China’s top five products are different from those of India and Indonesia.  Therefore, SITC53
Table 3.6. Top five export products to East Asia
(Unit:  Billions of United States dollars)
SITC
Product name 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Rev. 3
China
78439 Other motor vehicle parts 0.80 1.18 1.52 1.98 2.48
71323 Parts/access motorcycles 0.22 0.26 0.35 0.46 0.59
6252 Motor vehicle body parts n.e.s 0.16 0.26 0.35 0.44 0.53
78434 Tyres, new, bus or lorry 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.41 0.47
78432 Recip. piston eng >1,000 cc 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.44 0.41
India
78439 Other motor vehicle parts 0.05 0.16 0.14 0.07 0.10
71323 Tyres, new, bus or lorry 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07
6252 Motor vehicle gear boxes 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
78434 Motor vehicle chassis+engine 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
78432 Motor vehicle body parts n.e.s. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Indonesia
78439 Other motor vehicle parts 0.29 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.44
71323 Tyres, new, for motor car 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.30
6252 Motor vehicle gear boxes 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.17
78434 Motor vehicle body parts n.e.s 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.09
78432 Parts/access motorcycles 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.06 0.05
Source: Calculations based on United Nations Comtrade data.
Table 3.7. Top five import products from East Asia
(Unit:  Billions of United States dollars)
SITC
Product name 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Rev. 3
China
78434 Motor vehicle gear boxes 0.78 0.93 1.44 2.10 2.67
78439 Other motor vehicle parts 1.34 1.51 1.63 1.84 1.87
78432 Motor vehicle body parts n.e.s 1.08 1.36 1.49 1.18 1.07
71322 Recip. piston eng >1,000 cc 0.45 0.58 0.48 0.40 0.53
78433 Motor vehicle brakes/parts 0.32 0.37 0.44 0.48 0.46
India
78439 Other motor vehicle parts 0.30 0.37 0.39 0.57 1.16
71323 Diesel etc. engines 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.20 0.23
6252 Tyres, new, bus or lorry 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.1354
78439 and 78432 products are intensively traded by the three countries in East Asia based
on product quality.
3.3.1.1. Impact of RTAs on IPNs in the automotive sector
This sub-section explores whether the proliferation of RTA supports the development
of IPN.  Survey evidence from China, India and Indonesia is unanimous in showing that the
current regime of RTAs does not help to enhance IPNs in the automotive sector in those
countries.  However, the evidence does show that RTAs have the potential to boost trade in
the automotive industry in the region.  There are several common driving factors.
First, RTAs signed by China, India and Indonesia either exclude the automotive
industry or the agreement is too general to accommodate that industry’s specific needs.  In
the case of India, since it trades more with Western countries than with East Asia, the
benefit of signing an RTA with countries in East Asia is debatable.  Although auto parts and
components in the Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (IJEPA) (table 3.9)
encompass a wide variety of parts and component products, industry players in Indonesia
have noted that IJEPA does very little to expand Indonesia’s automotive industry.  This may
be due to the fact that these products have different tariff reduction schedules.  Tariffs for
some products are immediately reduced when the agreement is in force; some are even
eliminated after the agreement is in force while others have different reduction schedules,
ranging from 4 to 15 years’ annual schedule.  However, the RTA between India and Thailand
reveals a positive outlook, as trade between the two countries in gearboxes and parts used
for spark ignition in engines has increased (chapter 5 in this volume).
Nevertheless, the mixed current outcome of IPN formalization through trade
agreements in the case of the automotive industry indicates that RTAs have not reached
their potential yet.  In the case of China, RTAs do not affect the trade of auto parts and
components simply because they exclude those products.  This is due to the view held by
Table 3.7 (continued)
(Unit:  Billions of United States dollars)
SITC
Product name 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Rev. 3
78434 Motor vehicle gear boxes 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.12
78432 Motor vehicle body parts n.e.s 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.10
Indonesia
78439 Other motor vehicle parts 0.67 0.89 0.62 0.42 1.78
71323 Parts/access motorcycles 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.19 0.61
6252 Motor vehicle drive axles etc. 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.19
78434 Motor vehicle body parts n.e.s 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.16
78432 Recip. piston eng <1,000 cc 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.12
Source: Calculations based on United Nations Comtrade data.55
the Chinese authorities that China is not ready yet for tariff-free competition in automotive
goods (chapter 4 in this volume).  As such, given the completion of tariff reductions in IJEPA
and the ongoing dynamics of ITFTA, RTAs could provide more support in expanding IPNs.
With regard to ACFTA, the mutual exclusion of the automotive sector, including parts
and components, is of interest.  Four ASEAN countries that have a thriving automotive
sector, i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, have included the sector in
their highly sensitive lists.  Meanwhile, China also includes cars, trucks, buses and auto
parts in its highly sensitive list.  Therefore, why are these countries ignoring the lucrative
benefits to be gained from opening their automotive sectors? There are two possible
reasons.
First, from the perspective of the ASEAN countries, their automotive sectors are not
yet ready to compete with Chinese firms.  This view is also shared by the Chinese firms and
authorities; an RTA would benefit a country only when the capabilities and capacities of the
industry have reached a competitive level.
The second reason is the significant presence of Japanese MNCs in the automotive
industry in ASEAN countries.  Japanese MNCs have been dominating the region’s
automotive sector for more than 40 years, during which they have been steadily increasing
their capacity and expertise, and expanding their networks in the region.  Chinese
automotive firms must tread carefully and build up their capacity and capability in order to
compete with Japanese MNCs.  To date, the presence of Chinese firms in South-East Asia
Table 3.8. RTA partners of China, India and Indonesia
RTA partners China India Indonesia
China – (a) (c)
India (a) – (b)
Indonesia (c) (b) –
Japan – – (e)
Malaysia (c) (b) (d)
Philippines (c) (b) (d)
Republic of Korea (a) (a) (f)
Singapore (c) (b) (d)
Thailand (c) (b) (d)
Viet Nam (c) (b) (d)
Sources: Compiled from Asia-Pacific Trade Agreements Database (APTIAD) and WTO RTA database.
Notes: The existence of RTAs between countries is denoted by the green cells.  The blue cell
denotes RTAs that are still under negotiation.  Gray cells indicate no RTA.  The characters in
the brackets stand for: (a) RTA partner in APTA (in force since 17 June 1976); (b) RTA partner
in ASEAN-India RTA (in force since 1 January 2010, goods only); (c) RTA partner in ASEAN-
China FTA (in force since 1 January 2005 (goods) and 1 July 2007 (services); (d) RTA partner
in ASEAN Free Trade Area; (e) Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (in force
since 1 July 2008); and (f) RTA partner in ASEAN-Republic of Korea RTA (in force since
1 January 2010 (goods) and 1 May 2009 (services).56
remains insignificant.  The only presence of Chinese automotive firms in the region is in
Indonesia, with Geely and Chery conducting low-volume CKD operations.  Geely assembles
less than 50 cars per month and Cherry only sold 240 cars in 2009 (Chrysler, 2010).
The exclusion of the automotive sector from ACFTA is in stark contrast to the RTAs
between individual ASEAN countries and Japan.  In IJEPA, for example, the automotive
industry is given more market access through tariff elimination schedules.  In particular,
numerous auto parts and component products are included in IJEPA (table 3.9).
The inclusion of numerous auto parts and components is significant, since on paper
this sector has the potential to expand the IPN in the auto sector between Indonesian and
Japanese firms.  In view of this, Japanese MNCs are one step ahead of Chinese firms.
Nonetheless, China is slowly building its capacity in the automotive sector, especially in
manufacturing parts and components.  In 2007, China became a net exporter of auto parts
and components; by 2008 it had become the third largest automobile manufacturer, trailing
the United States and Japan (chapter 4 in this volume).  Considering the emergence of
China’s auto industry, it is only a matter of time before the automotive sector is brought into
trade negotiations between China and ASEAN countries.
Table 3.9. Auto parts and components included in IJEPA and IFTA
RTA
Products included in RTA
HS Code Description
Indonesia-Japan 4009 Pipes and hoses of vulcanized rubber other than
Economic Partnership hard rubber, with or without their fitting (for example,
Agreement (IJEPA)
a joints, elbows, flanges)
4010 Conveyor or transmission belts or belting of vulcanized
rubber
4011 New pneumatic tyres, of rubber
4012 Retreaded or used pneumatic tyres of rubber;
solid or cushion tyres, tyre treads and tyre flaps,
of rubber
4013 Inner tubes, of rubber
4016 Other article of vulcanized rubber other than hard
rubber
6813 Brake linings and pads
7320 Springs and leaves for springs, of iron or steel
8407 Spark-ignition reciprocating or rotary internal
combustion piston engines
8409 Compression-ignition internal combustion piston
engines (diesel or semi-diesel engines)
8413 Pumps for liquids, whether or not fitted with
measuring device; liquid elevators57
8421 Centrifuges, including centrifugal dryers; filtering or
purifying machinery and apparatus, for liquids of gases
8482 Ball and roller bearings
8483 Transmission shafts (including cam shafts and crank
shafts) and cranks, bearing housing and plain shaft
bearings; gears and gearing; ball or roller screws;
gear boxes and other speed changers, including torque
converters; flywheels and pulleys, including pulley
blocks; clutches and shaft couplings (including
universal joints)
8484 Gaskets and similar joints of metal sheeting combined
with other materials or of two or more layers of metal;
sets of assortments of gaskets and similar joints,
dissimilar in composition, put up in pouches envelopes
or similar packing; mechanical seals
8706 Chassis fitted with engines, for vehicles of headings
8701 to 8705
8708 Parts and accessories of the motor vehicles of
heading 8701 to 8705
India-Thailand Free 870840 Gear boxes




a Pasha and Setiati, chapter 6 in this volume and 
b Nag, chapter 5 in this volume.
Note: China’s RTA excludes automotive parts and components.
Table 3.9 (continued)
RTA
Products included in RTA
HS Code Description
8 These methods are explained in more detail in chapter 2.
Second, the costs of complying with RTA procedures to obtain exemptions outweigh
its benefits.  In China, industry respondents were of the opinion that if auto parts and
components were to be included in RTAs then documentation requirements to utilize the
tariff concessions would need to be less cumbersome.  This is particularly important for
assemblers who obtain components from various countries and are partners in different
RTAs.  Complying with RTA procedures to obtain concessions may not be worth the effort if
the tariff reductions are small.  Related to this factor is the issue of rules of origin (RoO).
Custom procedures impede the flow of goods to and from the three countries.  There are
a number of methods to determine origin.
8 The three basic approaches are:  (a) change in
tariff classification; (2) the criteria of local value-added content; and (c) specific
manufacturing process requirements.  There are also three additional factors to take into
account:  (a) cumulation; (b) the de minimis rule (tolerance); and (c) duty drawback.
Table 3.10 lists the methods being used to determine origin by selected RTAs in which
China, India and Indonesia are participating.  Table 3.10 shows that the selected RTAs use58
a combination of methods to determine origin.  The use of multiple methods to establish
origin will result in overlapping RoO among RTAs and create the so-called “noodle bowl”
effect.
The threshold for local value-added content in the RTAs listed in table 3.10 is 40 per
cent, with some exceptions for the India-Thailand Free Trade Agreement.  The adoption of
the 40 per cent rule implies a move towards simpler RoO, which would assist in facilitating
the expansion of trade between the countries involved and thereby expand IPNs, while
reducing the “noodle bowl” effect.
Another important issue is the implementation of RoO.  One example revealed by
the survey in China is non-tariff barrier-related RoO, where classification of parts and
components is a huge problem.  In Japan and Malaysia the product code for ABS braking
systems is HS 9032 (electrical systems), while in Thailand the product code for ABS braking
systems is HS 8708 (hydraulic brakes).  In addition, HS 8708 is included in Thailand’s list of
highly sensitive products in ACFTA, while HS 9032 is not included in Malaysia’s list of
sensitive and highly sensitive products in ACFTA.  The difference in the import duty between
these two codes varies greatly (Ramasamy, 2011).  Thus, variations in customs codes pose
a problem for manufacturers who source parts from various countries, thereby inhibiting
wider IPNs.











ASEAN FTA Yes Regional Diagonal
(AFTA)
a (40%)
ASEAN-China Yes Regional Diagonal
(ACFTA)
a (40%)







India-Thailand Yes Domestic Yes Bilateral






a Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, (2007); 
b Chapter 3: Rules of origin of the Agreement
between Japan and the Republic of Indonesia for an Economic Partnership, 
c Framework
Agreement with Thailand: Interim Rules of Origin.59
The surveys also showed the importance of transportation and telecommunications
in developing IPNs.  Indian firms have adopted e-sourcing to help them reorganize the
purchasing process, thereby reducing time spent on negotiations.  Rapid development of
ICT and infrastructure has played an important role in allowing MNCs to reduce costs and
risks in China.  The Indonesian survey highlighted the lack of a proper transport
infrastructure, particularly the problem of congested roads connecting production facilities
and ports.  Thus, the importance of reducing service link costs was underlined.
The survey in China also reported that streamlined customs and clearance
procedures would be beneficial.  Based on the perceptions of logistics ground operators,
China and India are doing far better in providing logistics infrastructure compared to
Indonesia (as shown in table 3.1).  It implies that both China and India are taking the
necessary steps to reduce service link costs in order to facilitate IPNs further.  The
recognition of the importance of reducing service link costs in China, India and Indonesia
implies that such costs alone cannot solely depend on RTA tariff reductions, but must also
be accompanied by improvement in trade facilitation.
9
3.3.2. Hard disk drive industry
Thailand is one of the world’s major producers and exporters of hard disk drives
(HDD) in the world.  HDD production began in Thailand around 1983 with the entry of
Seagate Technology of the United States.  The company’s prime motive for the relocation
was to access the relatively low cost of labour in Thailand.  During the initial five years of
operation in Thailand, Seagate trained numerous technical workers (resulting in a positive
spillover effect), many of whom were employed by new suppliers; the consequence was the
emergence of local suppliers.  As a result, other HDD manufacturers such as IBM and
Fujitsu began relocating to Thailand.
Subsequently, the Government of Thailand, through its Board of Investment (BOI),
began to implement trade and investment promotion policies to advance the HDD industry.
Thailand also began to lower its related tariff rates; however, the tariff rates for HDD
components are higher than tariffs for the final product.  Nevertheless, this distorted tariff
structure (the opposite of tariff escalation that is normally practiced) is offset by the
investment promotion policy.  HDD makers with an export-sale ratio greater than 30 per cent
are granted tariff exemptions.  Thus, the incentive policy plays an important factor in
Thailand’s HDD industry and its IPN participation.  Table 3.11 shows Thailand’s IIT levels in
HDD parts and components between 2004 and 2008
10.
Thailand is a major player in the HDD industry in East Asia.  Table 3.12 shows that
Thailand’s major HDD trading partners are Asian countries.  This indicates a strong
integration within the industry in Asia, particularly East and South-East Asia.
9 Trade facilitation is defined by WTO as removing obstacles to the movement of goods across
borders, e.g., the simplification of custom procedures.
10 Calculated based on Harmonized System (HS) 1996 at the 4 and 6 digit levels.  The data at the
6-digit level are ball bearings and other components.  The rest of the data are at the 4-digit level.  For
a complete list of product codes used for the HDD sector, see Annex II60







Source: Calculated from United Nations Comtrade data.
Table 3.12. Thailand’s five major trading partners in HDD components
(Unit: $ billion)
Partner 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Export partner
Japan 0.83 0.80 0.77 0.65 0.56
China 0.19 0.62 0.53 0.67 0.49
Hong Kong, China 0.40 0.48 0.63 0.52 0.39
Singapore 0.53 0.49 0.46 0.31 0.31
Malaysia 0.24 0.39 0.24 0.22 0.26
Import partner
Japan 0.80 0.80 0.86 0.93 0.93
China 0.45 0.49 0.63 0.77 0.78
Australia 0.27 0.37 0.54 0.56 0.60
Malaysia 0.15 0.35 0.47 0.58 0.38
Taiwan Province of China 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.19
Source: Calculations based on United Nations Comtrade data.
However, it is interesting to note that Thailand has steadily increased its imports of
HDD components from Asia, while exports of HDD components from Thailand to East Asia
have shown a decreasing trend (figure 3.5).  On the other hand, Thailand is a strong
exporter of HDD final products in East Asia with export values far above import values, with
net export values increasing from $1.42 billion in 2004 to $5.07 billion in 2008 (figure 3.6).
An interesting aspect of the Thailand case study is the coexistence between
industrial clustering and production networking.  Domestic fragmentation resulting from
industrial clustering does not completely rule out the industry making use of globalized
production.  It depends on what layers of the process are fragmented.  In the production
network of HDD components, manufacturers are at the centre with at least two layers of
suppliers.  In the first layer, HDD makers interact directly with Tier 1 suppliers.  The second
layer emerges when Tier 1 suppliers obtain inputs from Tier 2 suppliers.  Domestic61
Figure 3.5. Thai exports and imports of HDD components with Asian partners
Source: United Nations Comtrade data.  The partners are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China,
Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore and Viet Nam.
Figure 3.6. Thai exports and imports of HDD final products with its Asian partners
Source: United Nations Comtrade data.  The partners are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China,
Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia,






















































































fragmentation is likely to occur in the first layer, since various customized parts and
components are traded in that layer.  Thus, interpersonal participation is required in order to
create effective and efficient coordination.  The need for customization in HDD parts and
components requires a high degree of control.  That control is provided by the cluster
through close geographical proximity, which reduces service link costs from weaker control.
International fragmentation occurs in the second layer between Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers.
This is because the intermediates used by Tier 1 require less customization (for example,
printed circuit boards and integrated circuits, which can also be used in other industries).
Thus, the market-led IPN has been successful in transforming Thailand into a major
player in the HDD industry.  Survey evidence showed that RTAs have a neutral effect on the
IPN in Thailand’s HDD industry.  HDD manufacturer and components suppliers stated they
had no plan to utilize RTA-related concessions.  There is no problem with market access
since the tariff for HDD is zero in accordance with the Information and Technology
Agreement.  On procuring intermediates that have non-zero tariffs, using the BOI tariff
exemption scheme is preferable to using RTA schemes, as the BOI scheme offers tariff
exemptions on imports of inputs used for export-oriented activities.  For example, the
Thailand case study examined the pattern of motor imports, a component essential to
producing HDDs.  In 2009, 63.4 per cent of motor imports applied for tariff exemption
schemes, whereas motor imports under the RTA preferential scheme accounted for only
about 2 per cent.  The Government of Thailand provides incentives such as tariff exemption
on inputs and facilitates the development of industrial clusters, which is interesting as this
has inadvertently reduced service link costs which foster market-led IPNs.
3.3.3. Textiles and clothing industry
Bangladesh is a major exporter of knitwear and woven-wear products.  The country’s
IPN in textiles and clothing has been developed gradually since the 1980s.  The low cost of
production induced by low wage level attracted foreign firms to relocate this labour intensive
production process to Bangladesh.  The Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) also provided least
developed countries such as Bangladesh with a quota facility for duty-free exports of
apparel to the United States and European Union markets.  This also induced foreign firms
to shift production facilities to Bangladesh in order to reap the benefits from the MFA quota
system.
The involvement of entrepreneurs from the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of
China and Hong Kong, China, who were attracted by the MFA advantages, paved the way
for the development of export processing zones (EPZs) that provided benefits such as tax
holidays, duty drawback and tariff exemption for raw material imports.  Over time, spillover
effects gave way to the development of local entrepreneurship.  Domestic policies assisted
in developing such entrepreneurship, such as easy bank loans and back-to-back letters of
credit.  In addition, the textile and clothing industry flourished under the MFA until its
dissolution in 2004, and utilized the European Union EBA (Everything but Arms) market
access initiative; in essence that granted Bangladesh the same duty-free access as that
under the MFA, albeit without the quota.  Moreover, unilateral liberalization took place
through the reduction of tariffs, non-tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions.  In summary,63
Bangladesh’s involvement in the textile and clothing IPN is due to low labour costs,
preferential access provided by the MFA and European Union EBA, autonomous trade
liberalization and growth of local entrepreneurship.
However, the depth of the IPN in Bangladesh’s textile and clothing trade with East
Asia needs to be carefully assessed.  Table 3.13 shows that Bangladesh has a modest IIT in
raw materials and intermediates,
11 (specifically within the textile and clothing industry) with
East Asia.  Nonetheless, the IIT for 2006 displays an anomaly of 0.62, which is considerably
higher in comparison with other years.  This may be attributable to the characteristics of the
textile and clothing industry in which buyers can instruct firms to use specific materials from
a specific country.








Source: Calculated from United Nations Comtrade data.
Further examination of Bangladesh’s main import partners confirms this fact
(table 3.14).  In 2006, Bangladesh imported $970 million worth of raw materials and
intermediate products from China.  This also confirms the survey result showing the growth
of Bangladesh imports from China, not only because of the price factor but also because of
specific instructions from buyers to use particular types of materials from specific countries.
11 Calculated based on Harmonized System (HS) 1996 at the 2-digit level.  For a complete list of
product codes used for the HDD sector, see Annex II.
Table 3.14. Top five import partners of Bangladesh in textiles and clothing
raw materials and intermediaries
(Billions of United States dollars)
Partner 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
China 0.47 0.58 0.64 0.97 0.64
India 0.29 0.35 0.30 0.44 0.57
Uzbekistan 0.24 0.32 0.34 0.44 0.51
Taiwan Province of China 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.19
Thailand 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.18
Source: United Nations Comtrade data.64
Meanwhile, East Asia does not appear as a main Bangladesh export destination for
textile and clothing final goods.  As figure 3.7 shows, values of exports to East Asia are
relatively small compared to those for exports to the United States and the European Union.
This fact can also be used to support the claim that networks between Bangladesh and East
Asia are not yet extensive enough.
Figure 3.7. Export values of final goods from Bangladesh
Source: United Nations Comtrade data.  For a complete list of the product codes of textile and

















































RTAs are not considered an important factor in the development of the textiles and
clothing IPN in Bangladesh.  This is largely because the sourcing pattern for raw materials
and intermediate products in the textile and clothing industry relies heavily on buyer’s
specifications, geographical proximity, adequate supplies of the materials, the long-term
relationship between buyer and seller, and the price and quality of the products.  Thus, the
role of RTAs in strengthening the IPN is less evident.
An important feature of the Bangladesh textile and clothing industry is its reliance on
preference given by developed countries, such as that under the European Union EBA, to
attract foreign investors.  However, relying solely on the European Union EBA is not enough
to move up the production chain.  Investment in newer technology is needed so that the
textile and clothing industry can increase its product quality and move one step ahead of the
competitors in countries that are also given the European Union EBA preferences.
However, newly acquired technology without product diversification to produce more
sophisticated products cannot move Bangladesh’s textile and clothing industry up the65
ladder.  This can also be seen in the case of Viet Nam, where new technology made it
possible for rapid production adjustment; however, its textile and clothing industry still
neglects markets with high-quality requirements and continues to cater to markets for
unsophisticated products such as shirts and jackets (Trinh and Dinh, 2009).  Another
interesting fact revealed by the Bangladesh survey is that trade facilitation is considered
essential to improving the procurement process of raw materials and intermediate products.
Therefore, improved trade facilitation is an important element in reducing service link costs
and IPN development.
In summary, there is less evidence of IPNs in the textile and clothing industry in
Bangladesh.  This is largely because the sourcing pattern for raw materials and intermediate
products relies heavily on buyer specifications, geographical proximity, adequate supplies of
materials, the long-term relationship between buyer and seller, and price and quality of the
products.  Thus, there is only a one-way trade in the textile and clothing industry.  Compared
to the automotive and HDD sectors, Bangladesh’s IPN network in the textile and clothing
sector is still in the early stages of development.
3.4. Summary of findings in the case studies
A common theme emerges from the five case studies.  They reveal that in an age of
numerous RTAs, policy initiatives are still a critical part in attracting foreign MNCs.  These
policy initiatives are mostly in the form of tariff exemptions for importing intermediate
products or for high local content value and tax reductions.  The policies are an integral part
of the countries’ strategy to attract foreign MNCs to relocate some of their production
activities to the countries studied.  This finding highlights the important role of MNCs in
developing IPNs.  Another important finding is that based on the perception of the business
sector in the countries being studied, they all concur that RTAs are not a major factor in the
development of IPNs.  This may be explained by the fact that most of the RTAs are still in
the early period of enforcement and it will take some time for them to have a drastic effect
on trade; for example, the schedule for IJEPA tariff reductions for automotive parts and
components varies between immediate reduction after the agreement has been enforced
and a reduction or elimination after 15 years.  Given the discrepancies in the tariff reduction
schedule for different automotive parts and component products, it may be that the effect of
RTAs on IPNs can only be noticed after some time has passed.  In addition, some RTAs
exclude specific sectors from the agreement.  One example is ACFTA, in which the
automotive sector is excluded, thereby driving a wedge in the IPN development of IPN
between the Chinese automakers and their South-East Asian counterparts.
Another important theme that has emerged from the case studies is the sceptical
view in the business sector regarding the role of existing RTAs in IPN development.  This is
mainly due to the complex procedure required to qualify for tariff reduction under RTAs.
Figure 3.1 shows that unilateral tariff reductions result in low MFN rates.  However, low MFN
rates appear to lead to the low utilization of RTA facilities, i.e., preferential tariff rates.  A
study done by Kirk (2007) found that low MFN rates contributed to the limited impact of
AFTA on trade, where less than 5 per cent of total intra-ASEAN trade took place under the
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT).  This implies that 95 per cent of intra-ASEAN66
trade occurred under MFN.  There are two factors that help explain this:  (a) the cost of
complying with RoO is high; and (b) the margin of preference, which is the difference
between the MFN rate and the preferential rate, is too small to compensate for the
administrative costs involved in applying for preferential treatment.
RoO are an important element of any RTA since they are required to ensure that
preferences are available only to those that take part in the agreement.  Thus, complying
with RoO in order to be eligible to receive preferential rates entails administrative costs.  As
a rule of thumb, if meeting the conditions of the RoO results in an increase in the cost of
intermediate goods compared to pre-RTA levels, then there is potential for trade diversion to
occur (Kirk, 2007).  In Indonesia’s case there is low utilization of the ASEAN CEPT, which
stems from the fact that MFN rates are already low in addition to the high cost and
cumbersome procedures involved in filling Form D
12 (Anas, 2007).  Moreover Anas indicated
that most of Indonesia’s imports from ASEAN countries were already subject to MFN rates
of less than 5 per cent.  In this case, trade diversion did not occur; Indonesia just chose to
utilize MFN rates instead of using the AFTA preferential rates provided by ASEAN CEPT.
Furthermore, Kirk (2007) showed that AFTA’s margin of preference is too small to
compensate for the administrative cost of applying for preferential rates.  A recent study by
Kawai and Wignaraja (2010) confirmed this.  They surveyed firms operating in Japan,
China, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines.  Their study revealed
that out of 551 sample firms, 17 per cent of them preferred not to utilize RTA benefits
because of the low margins of preference.  In addition, 15 per cent of the firms stated that
their non-use of RTA benefits was due to the administrative cost related to RoO.  However, it
should be noted that in their study, 35 per cent of the firms surveyed reported the major
reason for not using RTA benefits was the lack of information on RTAs.  However, existing
RTAs in the countries studied show that the thresholds for local value-added content are set
at a uniform rate of 40 per cent.  The adoption of the 40 per cent rule implies a move
towards a simpler RoO, which would facilitate more trade between countries involved in the
RTA.  Therefore, this would make RTAs more relevant in strengthening IPNs.  Thus, the
overlapping RoO would not be a huge hindrance since the rate for local content is the same
at 40 per cent.  It may be that the problem is not with the RoO, but rather with their
implementation.  The bureaucratic process involved in determining origin can be quite
difficult and time-consuming for firms, and may be a hindrance to using RTA benefits.  This
implies that the cost of complying with RoO is high.
Despite the fact that RTAs appear irrelevant in developing IPNs, they still have the
potential to increase trade and strengthen IPNs.  One example is ITFTA, which has
significantly increased trade in certain auto parts and components between the two
countries.  The survey of the HDD industry in Thailand suggests the coexistence of IPNs
and industrial clustering.  Industrial clustering has enabled foreign MNCs to reduce service
link costs.  Cumbersome customs procedures, minimal logistics and the transportation
infrastructure are important issues raised by all the respondents in interviews and focus
12 Form D is used by ASEAN members to obtain ASEAN CEPT rates for their products.67
group discussions.  In other words, service link costs are not low enough to facilitate more
trade.  Thus, RTAs without measures to smooth out trade friction arising from high service
link costs will not have any significant effect in generating more trade between the countries
involved.68
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Bangladesh APTA Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement Regional 1975 In force
(previously known as the Bangkok since 1976
Agreement)
BIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Regional In force
Multi-Sectoral Technical and since 2004
Economic Cooperation
GSTP Global System of Trade Global 1988 In force
Preferences among Developing (developing since 1989
Countries countries)
India- Trade Agreement between India Bilateral 2006 In force
Bangladesh and Bangladesh since 2006
PTA-D-8 Preferential Tariff Arrangement- Cross- 2006 Pending
Group of 8 Developing Countries Continental country
Plurilateral ratification
SAFTA South Asian Free Trade Area Regional 2004 In force
since 2006
  TPS – OIC Framework Agreement on Trade Cross- 2004 Pending
Preferential System among the Continental country
Member States of the Organization Plurilateral ratification
of the Islamic Conference
China ACFTA Agreement on Trade in Goods of Country- 2004 In force
the Framework Agreement on Bloc since 2005
Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation between the
Association of Southeast Asian
Nations and the People’s Republic
of China
ACFTA- Agreement on Trade in Services Country- 2007 In force
Services of the Framework Agreement on Bloc since 2007
Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation between ASEAN
and the People’s Republic of China
APTA Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement Regional 1975 In force
(previously known as the Bangkok since 1976
Agreement)
Australia- Australia-China Free Trade Bilateral Under
China  Agreement negotiation
since 2005
China-Chile Free Trade Agreement between Bilateral 2005 In force
the Government of the People’s since 2006
Republic of China and the
Government of the Republic of
Chile69
China- Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Bilateral 2003 In force
Hong Kong, Economic Partnership Agreement since 2004
China
China- China-Korea Free Trade Bilateral Under
Republic of Agreement negotiation
Korea since 2005
China- Mainland and Macao Closer Bilateral 2003 In force





China- Free Trade Agreement Bilateral 2006 In force
Pakistan between the Government of since 2007
the People’s Republic of
China and the Government
of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan
China-Peru Free Trade Agreement between Bilateral 2009 Pending
the Government of the People’s country
Republic of China and the ratification
Government of the Republic
of Peru
China- Free Trade Agreement between Bilateral 2008 In force
Singapore the Government of the People’s since 2009
Republic of China and the
Government of the Republic
of Singapore
New New Zealand-China Free Bilateral 2008 In force
Zealand- Trade Agreement since 2008
China
  Pakistan- Agreement on Trade in Services Bilateral 2009 Pending
China between the Government of the country
Services People’s Republic of China and ratification
the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan
India APTA Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement Regional 1975 In force
(previously known as the Bangkok since 1976
Agreement)
ASEAN- ASEAN-India Framework Country- 2003 In force
India FA Agreement on Comprehensive Bloc since 2004
Economic Cooperation
Bhutan-India Bhutan-India Free Trade Bilateral 2006 In force
Agreement since 2006
BIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Regional In force















GSTP Global System of Trade Global 1988 In force
Preferences among Developing (developing since 1989
Countries countries)
India- India-Afghanistan Preferential Bilateral 2003 In force
Afghanistan Trade Agreement since 2003
India- Trade Agreement between India Bilateral 2006 In force
Bangladesh and Bangladesh since 2006
India-Chile Preferential Trade Agreement Bilateral 2006 Pending
between the Republic of India and country
the Republic of Chile ratification
India-GCC Framework Agreement on Country- 2004 In force
Economic Cooperation between Bloc since 2006
the Republic of India and the
Member States of the Cooperation
Council for the Arab States of
the Gulf
India- India-MERCOSUR Preferential Country- 2004 Pending
MERCOSUR Trade Agreement Bloc country
ratification
since 2005
India-Nepal Indo-Nepal Treaty of Trade Bilateral 1991 In force
since 1991
India-SACU Preferential Trade Agreement Country- Under
between SACU and India Bloc negotiation
since 2002
India- Comprehensive Economic Bilateral 2005 In force
Singapore Cooperation Agreement between since 2005
the Republic of India and the
Republic of Singapore
India- Free Trade Agreement between Bilateral 1998 In force
Sri Lanka the Republic of India and the since 2001
Democratic Socialist Republic
of Sri Lanka
India- India-Thailand Framework Bilateral 2003 In force
Thailand Agreement for establishing an FTA since 2004










Republic of Korea-India Comprehensive Bilateral Pending
Korea-India Economic Partnership Agreement country
ratification
(2009)
 SAFTA South  Asian  Free  Trade  Area Regional 2004 In  force
since 2006
Indonesia AANZFTA ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Country- 2009 Pending
Free Trade Agreement Bloc country
ratification
ACFTA Agreement on Trade in Goods Country- 2004 In force





ACFTA- Agreement on Trade in Services Country- 2007 In force
Services of the Framework Agreement on Bloc since 2007
Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation between ASEAN and
the People’s Republic of China
AJCEP Agreement on Comprehensive Country- 2008 In force
Economics Partnership among Bloc since 2008
Japan and the Member States
of ASEAN
AKFTA Agreement on Trade in Goods Country- 2006 In force
under the Framework Agreement Bloc since 2007
on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation among the
Governments of the Member
States of ASEAN and the
Republic of Korea
ASEAN- ASEAN-European Union Free Bloc-Bloc Under
European Trade Agreement negotiation
Union since 2007
ASEAN- ASEAN-India Framework Country- 2003 In force
India FA Agreement on Comprehensive Bloc since 2004
Economic Cooperation
ASEAN- Framework Agreement on Country- 2005 In force
Republic of Comprehensive Economic Bloc since 2006
Korea FA Cooperation among the
Governments of the Member
States of ASEAN and the Republic
of Korea









ASEAN ASEAN Framework Agreement Regional 1995 In force
Services- on Services since 1996
AFAS
GSTP Global System of Trade Global 1988 In force
Preferences among Developing (developing since 1989
Countries countries)
Japan- Japan-Indonesia Economic Bilateral 2007 In force
Indonesia Partnership Agreement since 2008
PTA-D-8 Preferential Tariff Arrangement- Cross- 2006 Pending
Group of 8 Developing Countries Continental country
Plurilateral ratification
United USA-Indonesia Free Trade Bilateral Under
States-  Agreement negotiation
Indonesia since 2006
  United Trade and Investment Framework Country- 2006 In force
States- Arrangement between the United Bloc since 2006
ASEAN States of America and ASEAN
Thailand AANZFTA ASEAN – AUSTRALIA – Country- 2009 Pending
NEW ZEALAND FREE TRADE Bloc country
AGREEMENT ratification
ACFTA Agreement on Trade in Goods of Country- 2004 In force
the Framework Agreement on Bloc since 2005
Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation between ASEAN
and the People’s Republic
of China
ACFTA- Agreement on Trade in Services Country- 2007 In force
Services of the Framework Agreement on Bloc since 2007
Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation between ASEAN and
the People’s Republic of China
AJCEP Agreement on Comprehensive Country- 2008 In force
Economics Partnership among Bloc since 2008
Japan and the Member States
of ASEAN
ASEAN- ASEAN-European Union Free Bloc-Bloc Under
European Trade Agreement negotiation
Union since 2007
ASEAN- ASEAN-India Framework Country- 2003 In force
India FA Agreement on Comprehensive Bloc since 2004
Economic Cooperation
ASEAN ASEAN Free Trade Area Regional 1992 In force
Goods-AFTA since 1993
ASEAN ASEAN Framework Agreement on Regional 1995 In force









Australia- Thailand-Australia Free Trade Bilateral 2004 In force
Thailand Agreement since 2005
BIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Regional In force
Multi-Sectoral Technical and since 2004
Economic Cooperation
GSTP Global System of Trade Global 1988 In force
Preferences among Developing (developing since 1989
Countries countries)
India- India-Thailand Framework Bilateral 2003 In force
Thailand Agreement for establishing a FTA since 2004
Japan- Agreement between Japan and Bilateral 2007 In force
Thailand the Kingdom of Thailand for an since 2007
Economic Partnership
Lao People’s Lao People’s Democratic Republic- Bilateral 1991 In force
Democratic Thailand Preferential Trading since 1991
Republic- Arrangement
Thailand
New New Zealand-Thailand Closer Bilateral 2005 In force
Zealand- Economic Partnership Agreement since 2005
Thailand
Peru- Protocol between the Republic Bilateral 2005 Pending
Thailand of Peru and the Kingdom of country
Thailand to Accelerate the ratification
Liberalization of Trade in Goods
and Trade Facilitation
Thailand- Framework Agreement between Bilateral 2002 In force
Bahrain the Kingdom of Thailand and since 2002
the Kingdom of Bahrain on
Closer Economic Partnership
Thailand- Thailand-United States Free Bilateral Under
United States Trade Agreement negotiation
since 2004
  United Trade and Investment Framework Country- 2006 In force
States- Arrangement between the Bloc since 2006
ASEAN United States of America and
ASEAN
Source: Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreement Database.
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